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SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND IMMUNITY*
One of the most seminal contributions to the understandingof self-consciousness over the last half century has beenSydney Shoemaker’s articulation of the idea that we are
“immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-
person pronouns” (IEM).1 Along with related ideas developed by
Wittgenstein, Castenada, Evans, Perry, and Pryor,2 IEM has proven to
be extremely fertile in stimulating insights into the first-person per-
spective, “the distinctive way mental states present themselves to the
subjects whose states they are.”3 Moreover, Shoemaker’s formulation
of the idea has motivated significant interdisciplinary research into
self-consciousness.4
Since first formulating his position, Shoemaker has done much to
elaborate upon IEM and related notions. For more than four decades
he has been perspicaciously developing his ideas on identification-
freedom, introspection, self-knowledge, and the self-intimation of mental
states. Although some aspects of Shoemaker’s views on immunity have
been disputed, IEM itself has never been severely threatened by any
empirical challenge.5
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mous referees for their helpful comments on previous versions of this manuscript.
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research grants 97-2410-H-004-154-MY3 and 97-2410-H-002-184-MY3.
1 Sydney Shoemaker, “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness,” this journal, lxv,
19 (October 3, 1968): 555–67. In previous work he had attempted to make a similar
point by referring to certain self-ascriptions that are “noncriterial.” See Shoemaker, Iden-
tity, Cause, and Mind (New York: Oxford, 2003), p. 2.
2 See Ludwig Wittgenstein,The Blue and Brown Books (New York: Oxford, 1958). Also
see Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference (New York: Oxford, 1982); James Pryor,
“Immunity to Error through Misidentification,” Philosophical Topics, xxvi, 1–2 (1999):
271–304; and additional representative works in Andrew Brook and Richard DeVidi,
eds., Self-Reference and Self-Awareness (Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2001).
3 Shoemaker, The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays (Cambridge: MIT, 1996).
4 See Jose Bermudez et al., eds., The Body and the Self (Cambridge: MIT, 1995);
Bermudez, The Paradox of Self-Consciousness (Cambridge: MIT, 1998); and Masaharu
Mizumoto and Masato Ishikawa, “Immunity to Error through Misidentification and the
Bodily Illusion Experiment,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, xii, 7 (2005): 3–19.
5 For example: several essays in Brook and DeVidi, eds., op. cit.; Colin McGinn, The
Subjective View (New York: Oxford, 1983), pp. 45–55; Evans, op. cit., pp. 188–91; and
Bermudez, op. cit., pp. 6–8.
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Perhaps the most substantial empirical challenge thus far attempted
has been Campbell’s6 claim that schizophrenic thought insertions,
understood in terms of the Frith7 monitoring model, might serve as
a counterexample to IEM. Gallagher and Coliva have defended IEM
by (among other things) arguing that since schizophrenic thoughts
are still within a patient’s stream of consciousness, IEM is not vio-
lated.8 They hold that, as a matter of conceptual truth, “if a subject
is introspectively aware of a certain mental state, then she herself is
having it and, therefore, that mental state is her own.”9
In this paper we argue that IEM fails. In section i, we adumbrate
Shoemaker’s version of IEM along with related concepts central to
his understanding of self-consciousness. We also reject the interpreta-
tion of IEM as a tautology, and propose to treat it as a hypothesis. In
section ii, we present a clinical case—somatoparaphrenia—and in
section iii we describe an experiment with healthy subjects—the Body
Swap Illusion. In the former case, patients represent experienced sen-
sations as belonging to someone other than self. In the latter, an illu-
sion is created whereby subjects feel that they can shake hands with
themselves. The one concerns bodily sensations; the other, the sense
of agency.10 Both cases reveal that IEM lacks modal force: what IEM
says cannot happen, can happen. In section iv we respond to possible
criticisms of our position. In a concluding section we emphasize that
in order to account for the phenomena which seem to defy IEM-
based expectations, there is a need to distinguish the ownership of
mental states from the ownership of body parts. Moreover, concern-
ing the former, there is a compelling need to distinguish between
mental states that are instantiated and mental states that are represented
as belonging to oneself.
6 John Campbell, “Immunity to Error through Misidentification and the Meaning of
a Referring Term,” Philosophical Topics, xxvi, 1–2 (1999): 89–104.
7 Christopher Frith, The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia (Hove, UK: Erlbaum,
1992).
8 Shaun Gallagher, “Self-Reference and Schizophrenia: A Cognitive Model of Im-
munity to Error through Misidentification,” in Dan Zahavi, ed., Exploring the Self: Philo-
sophical and Psychological Perspectives on Self-Experience (Philadelphia: John Benjamins,
2000), pp. 203–39; Annalisa Coliva, “Thought Insertion and Immunity to Error through
Misidentification,” Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology, ix, 1 (2000): 27–34; and Coliva,
“On What There Really Is to Our Notion of a Thought,” Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psy-
chology, ix, 1 (March 2000): 41–46.
9 Coliva, “Thought Insertion,” p. 28.
10 In this paper “the sense of agency” and “agency” are used interchangeably. Both
terms refer to first-person, conscious experience. For recent discussion of “agentive
experience” see Tim Bayne, “The Sense of Agency,” in Fiona Macpherson, ed., The
Senses (New York: Oxford, 2011). Also see below, note 63.
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i. shoemaker’s immunity principle
In his reflections on self-consciousness, Shoemaker takes as a point of
departure what he regards as an incontrovertible conceptual truth:
“an experiencing is necessarily an experiencing by a subject of experi-
ence.”11 He evinces that a subject and an experience are just as inti-
mately related as are a branch and a branch-bending. He then proceeds
to develop a conception of self-consciousness that aspires to com-
patibility with both naturalism and certain Cartesian intuitions.
Developing one among these intuitions, and taking his lead from
Wittgenstein, Shoemaker marks a distinction between the use of “I”
(and its cognates) “as subject” and its use “as object.”12 Use-as-subject
refers to such expressions as “I am in pain”; use-as-object refers to
such expressions as “I am bleeding.” Imagine, for example, that a base-
runner and a catcher collide at home plate. As is not uncommon, the
catcher’s leg is gashed by the spikes on the base-runner’s shoes, although
the catcher does not immediately feel any pain. Because their limbs are
entangled, upon first seeing the wound, the catcher does not immedi-
ately recognize it as his. As they disentangle, and as the catcher notices
distinguishing features like the differences in their uniforms, he comes
to realize that it is he who is bleeding. Recognition from the outside, so
to speak, as in identifying the source of the bleeding, is recognition of
self-as-object. The experience of pain, by contrast, given that it is known
through introspection, typifies knowing about the self “as subject.”
Wittgenstein’s guiding intuition, one which is endorsed by Shoemaker,
is: “…there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have
tooth-ache [sic]. To ask ‘are you sure it is you who have pains?’ would
be nonsensical.”13 Shoemaker identifies the following as prototypical
expressions of self-as-subject: “I feel pain”; “I am waving my arm”;
and “I see a canary.”14 Clearly he believes that his argument is applica-
ble to bodily sensation, to the sense of agency, and to perception of the
external world. Take “I see a canary,” for example: I might be mistaken
concerning what I actually see (it might be a cardinal). I might even
11 Shoemaker, First-Person Perspective, p. 10.
12 Shoemaker, “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness”; Wittgenstein, op. cit., pp. 66–67.
13 Shoemaker, “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness,” p. 556.
14 Ibid., pp. 557–58. These three prototypical cases are all mental states that
Shoemaker elsewhere describes as “weakly self-intimating”: that is to say, it is the
nature of thesemental states to intimate themselves to their “possessors.”Cf. Shoemaker,
First-Person Perspective, pp. 50–52. Shoemaker adds that self-reference of this sort is not
restricted to first-person pronouns: names and definite descriptions can self-refer in
comparable ways. See Shoemaker, “Persons and Their Pasts,” American Philosophical
Quarterly, vii, 4 (October 1970): 269–85. The relevant discussion appears in footnotes 3
and 5. Also see Shoemaker, Identity, Cause, and Mind, p. 10, fn. 4.
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be hallucinating. But “it cannot happen that I am mistaken in saying
this because I have misidentified as myself the person I know to see
the canary.”15
Why should it be nonsensical to query whether one is certain that it
is oneself who is experiencing the mental state? Because, Shoemaker
maintains, when we make a judgment like “I feel pain,” we are aware
that “one does, oneself, feel pain…one is, tautologically, aware, not
simply that the attribute feel(s) pain is instantiated, but that it is instan-
tiated in oneself.”16 Accordingly, it simply “cannot happen that I am mis-
taken in saying ‘I feel pain’ because, although I do know of someone
that feels pain, I am mistaken in thinking that person to be myself.”17
The same is true for judgments about hand-waving or seeing canaries.
Notice that these cases exude the modal force of “cannot.” According
to Shoemaker this is what makes self-consciousness special.
Shoemaker further elucidates IEM. He says that to claim that
a statement “a is F” might be erroneous through misidentification
relative to the term “a” is to allow for the following possibility: “the
speaker knows some particular thing to be F, but makes the mistake
of asserting ‘a is F’ because, and only because, he mistakenly thinks
that the thing he knows to be F is what ‘a’ refers to.”18 But for IEM
statements, mistakes of this type are not possible. If the ground of my
judgment is introspection,19 whenever I say “I feel pain” it cannot be
the case that I am mistaken in thinking that the person in pain is
me. Likewise, whenever I say “I am waving my arm” or “I see a canary”
it cannot be the case that I have erroneously identified myself as the
person who waves his arm or sees the canary.
How is it that immunity should obtain in such cases? Shoemaker
replies that the relevant mental states are identification-free. He believes
that even when we need to identify self (as-object), identification “will
always presuppose the prior possession of other first-person informa-
tion.”20 If self-consciousness always involved identification, whenever
15 Italics added by the authors. Shoemaker distinguishes between absolute and cir-
cumstantial immunity. Our concern throughout this paper is exclusively with absolute
immunity as regards the self-attribution of mental states.
16 Shoemaker, “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness,” pp. 563–64.
17 Ibid., p. 557. Also see Shoemaker, “Self-Knowledge and ‘Inner Sense,’ Lecture I:
The Object Perception Model,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, liv, 2 ( June
1994): 249–69, at p. 258; Shoemaker, First-Person Perspective, p. 15.
18 Shoemaker, “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness,” p. 557. Here we are only con-
cerned with present-tense statements, but Shoemaker claims that IEM also holds for
certain memory judgments. See Shoemaker, “Persons and Their Pasts.”
19 Cf. Pryor, “Immunity to Error through Misidentification,” p. 279; and Joel Smith,
“Which Immunity to Error?” Philosophical Studies, cxxx, 2 (August 2006): 273–83.
20 Shoemaker, “Self-Knowledge and ‘Inner Sense,’ Lecture I,” p. 258.
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we self-ascribed a mental state (for example, “a is F ”) we would need
to establish both “b is F ” and “a 5 b.” But “b is F,” in turn, would
further require that “c is F ” and “b 5 c ” be established. To avoid an
infinite regress, we must allow for first-person knowledge that is not
grounded in an act of identification.
To illustrate this concern, consider the following. If I notice someone
on a shopping center video display, I might wonder whether it is me. In
order to make a proper identification, I might pull on my cap while
checking to see whether the person on the video display does likewise.
To perform this act of identification I must know that I myself am pulling
on my cap. How can I know that? According to Shoemaker, my first-
person knowledge that I am pulling on my cap must be grounded in
identification-free first-person knowledge, because the only alternative
would be just the sort of vicious infinite regress schematized above.21
Identification-freedom is also integrally related to his views on intro-
spection, the self-intimating character of mental states, and the impos-
sibility of self-blind creatures. For Shoemaker, introspective knowledge
refers to just routine, mundane sorts of knowledge.22 In his reflections on
how best to understand introspection, he rejects “inner sense” models,
notably the “object perception model” (OPM) and the “broad percep-
tual model” (BPM).
According to Shoemaker, if OPM is correct, then “identification in-
formation” about the perceived object must be available.23 Critically,
these objects would need to be independent of acts of perception. But
Shoemaker denies that there is any such role for awareness of self-
as-object to play in the explanation of introspective knowledge. Although
it might appear to be the case that self is a good candidate for being
an object of perception, Shoemaker believes that when we do need to
identify self-as-object, identification “will always presuppose the prior
possession of other first-person information.”24 Again, the only alterna-
tive to freedom from identification would be profligate identification,
identification that cannot but lead to vicious infinite regress.
Shoemaker also rejects BPM, which differs fromOPM in concerning
itself with facts rather than objects.25 Despite this difference, though,
21 Shoemaker, “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness,” p. 561, and First-Person Perspective,
p. 196.
22 “The knowledge I have in mind is…the humdrum kind of knowledge that is ex-
pressed in such remarks as ‘It itches,’ ‘I’m hungry,’ ‘I don’t want to,’ and ‘I’m bored.’”
See Shoemaker, “Self-Knowledge and ‘Inner Sense,’ Lecture I,” p. 249.
23 Ibid., pp. 252–53.
24 Ibid., pp. 254, 258.
25 Shoemaker, “Self-Knowledge and ‘Inner Sense,’ Lecture II: The Broad Perceptual
Model,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, liv, 2 ( June 1994): 271–90.
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BPM shares a fundamental commitment to the view that in perception
we have access to things that are independent of being perceived. So
identification-freedom would be incompatible with this model too.
Shoemaker’s rejection of BPM is also linked to his rejection of the pos-
sibility of “introspective self-blindness.” He believes that a significant—
and unacceptable—consequence of BPM is that it allows for the logical
possibility of this particular kind of blindness.26 To be introspectively self-
blind with respect to certain kinds of mental phenomena would require
that, despite being able to conceive of those phenomena ( just as the
blind can conceive of phenomena unseen), a creature would be unable
to introspectively access them. According to Shoemaker, BPM is only
worth taking seriously if self-blindness is regarded as a conceptual possi-
bility.27 But he regards this notion to be as absurd as the claim that we
could have pains but be systematically and blithely unaware of them.28
In short, in addition to IEM, Shoemaker endorses a “modest Carte-
sianism,” a “weak version of the self-intimation thesis” (WST). On
this view, the existence of certain mental entities is constitutively re-
lated to their being available to introspection. For those mental states
that have phenomenal character, for example, it is of their essence
that having them “issues in the subject’s being introspectively aware
of that character, or does so if the subject reflects.”29 There might well
be internal states to which we do not have introspective access, states
that play an important role in causing behavior. But Shoemaker says
such states would not count as mental. The proper way to think of
the relationship between introspection and mental states is that
“the reality known and the faculty for knowing it are…made for each
other—neither could be what it is without the other.”30
Most philosophers regard IEM as a semantic or conceptual thesis.
Recall that, according to Shoemaker, when one proclaims self to be in
pain “one does, oneself, feel pain…one is, tautologically, aware, not
simply that the attribute feel(s) pain is instantiated, but that it is in-
stantiated in oneself.” Unlike Shoemaker, we do not regard this as a
tautology. On the contrary, it can be subjected to empirical investiga-
tion. Our main thesis is: awareness that mental states are instantiated
does not entail awareness that said states are instantiated in self.
Unlike most critics of Shoemaker, for the sake of argument, we grant
26 Ibid., p. 273.
27 Shoemaker, First-Person Perspective, p. 31.
28 Shoemaker, “Self-Knowledge and ‘Inner Sense,’ Lecture II,” p. 275.
29 Shoemaker, “Introspection and Phenomenal Character,” Philosophical Topics, xxviii,
2 (2001): 247–73; cf. Shoemaker, First-Person Perspective, p. 31.
30 Shoemaker, “Self-Knowledge and ‘Inner Sense,’ Lecture II,” p. 289. Also see p. 275.
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that most of his views are correct. Even so, we argue that genuine
counter-examples to IEM exist.
ii. iem and bodily sensations: somatoparaphrenia
Somatoparaphrenia is a syndrome that is characterized by the sense
of profound estrangement from parts of one’s body.31 It is typically
found in patients who have suffered extensive right-hemisphere lesions
(usually vascular).32 Lesions in the temporoparietal junction are a com-
mon neural correlate of somatoparaphrenia, but deep cortical regions
(for example, the posterior insula) and subcortical regions (for example,
the basal ganglia) are also sometimes implicated.33
Somatoparaphrenia is also closely associated with proprioceptive
impairment and often (not always) co-morbid with hemispatial neglect.
Patients feel that a contralesional limb, most frequently the hand,
seems not to belong to them; indeed, it often seems to belong to some-
one in particular, not uncommonly an acquaintance.34 The sense of
disownership can be so vivid that even after recovery patients continue
to describe the estrangement in factive, not metaphoric, language.35
Baier and Karnath assessed the frequency of somatoparaphrenia’s
occurrence.36 They recently examined 79, consecutively admitted, acute
stroke patients with right brain damage. They found that 11 experienced
estrangement: five exhibited asomatognosia, and six were afflicted with
somatoparaphrenia. Of the six, two attributed ownership of the limb to
their wives, three to their examining physicians, and one to a patient
sharing the same room.
Somatoparaphenia is occasionally accompanied not only by
hemispatial neglect, but also by tactile extinction (the loss of conscious
31 Giuseppe Vallar and Roberta Ronchi, “Somatoparaphrenia: A Body Delusion.
A Review of the Neuropsychological Literature,” Experimental Brain Research, cxcii,
3 (2009): 533–51.
32 For an exceptional case, see Rogerio Beato et al., “Transitory Somatoparaphrenia
Associated with a Left Frontoparietal Meningioma,” Journal of Neurology, cclvii, 7 ( July
2010): 1208–10. For competing explanations of apparent lateralization, see Gabriella
Bottini et al., “Productive Symptoms in Right Brain Damage,” Current Opinion in Neurology,
xxii, 6 (December 2009): 589–98, at p. 591.
33 Vallar and Ronchi, op. cit., p. 548.
34 Instances characterized just by the sense of limb disownership are referred to as
asomatognosia; instances wherein limb ownership is attributed to someone else—some
specific person—are referred to as somatoparaphrenia. The two are anatomically distinct.
See Todd Feinberg et al., “TheNeuroanatomy of Asomatognosia and Somatoparaphrenia,”
Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry, lxxxi, 3 (2010): 276–81.
35 Peter Halligan et al., “Unilateral Somatoparaphrenia after Right Hemisphere
Stroke: A Case Description,” Cortex, xxxi, 1 (March 1995): 173–82.
36 Bernhard Baier and Hans-Otto Karnath, “Tight Link Between Our Sense of Limb
Ownership and Self-Awareness of Actions,” Stroke: Journal of the American Heart Association,
xxxix, 2 (2008): 486–88.
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tactile perception) in the estranged body part. Moro et al. demon-
strated (for two cases) that merely by changing the position of the
hands—moving the left hand across the midline of the body, over to
the right-hand side—tactile sensation could be recovered.37 Even though
tactile sensation could be so readily recovered, the sense of limb dis-
ownership was unchanged.
As regards our challenge to IEM, the most relevant case has been
described by Bottini et al.38 A woman (“FB”) reported that her left
hand belonged to her niece and that she, FB, felt no tactile sensa-
tions there. In FB’s case the lesion was subcortical, involving the basal
ganglia, white matter underlying the insula, as well as other areas.
But, importantly, the primary somatosensory area—which is critical to
processing tactile sensation—was preserved. As Bottini et al. record:
“F.B.’s spared ability to perceive tactile stimuli, provided that these were
referred to someone else’s body, was evidently based on the survival
of some elementary somatosensory cortical functions.”39
In a series of controlled tests, FB, while blindfolded, was advised
that the examiner would touch her left hand; next, the examiner
would in fact touch the dorsal surface of FB’s hand. Whenever this
was done, FB said that she could feel no tactile sensations. When ad-
vised that the examiner was about to touch her niece’s hand, however,
upon being touched FB reported feeling tactile sensation. Here we
begin to see the relevance of FB’s case to IEM.
It should be borne in mind that FB was in all other aspects cogni-
tively sound.40 Moreover, in order to ensure that these tests would be
reliable, catch trials—wherein FB was led to expect touches that were
not forthcoming—were used. These trials were evenly distributed
across three verbal warnings—I am going to touch your right hand,
your left hand, and your niece’s hand—and were administered in
four sessions, two on one day, two on the next. It is of paramount
importance to note that in not even one of 36 catch trials, nine each
per session, did FB respond incorrectly.41 In other words, when ad-
vised that she (or her “niece”) would be touched, if no contact was
made, FB always reported “no,” no contact had been made.
37 Valentine Moro et al., “Changes in Spatial Position of Hands Modify Tactile Ex-
tinction but not Disownership of Contralesional Hand in Two Right Brain-Damaged
Patients,” Neurocase, x, 6 (2004): 437–43.
38 Gabriella Bottini et al., “Feeling Touches in Someone Else’s Hand,” NeuroReport,
xiii, 11 (2002): 249–52.
39 Italics added by the authors. Bottini et al., op. cit., p. 251.
40 According to the clinical report, FB was “fully oriented in time and space and did
not show any other sign of mental deterioration on the Mini Mental State Examination
(score: 26/31).” See ibid.
41 Ibid., Table 1.
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As we begin examining IEM in light of this case, let us assume, for
the sake of argument, that Shoemaker’s central theses are largely cor-
rect. WST is true; both OPM and BPM, false. Moreover, self-as-subject
is indeed distinct from self-as-object.
But even if we grant to Shoemaker his principal theses, we are left
with an explanatory puzzle: why is it that when FB is expecting to be
touched (on the left hand), she feels nothing, whereas when she
expects that her niece will be touched there, she is able to report
tactile sensation? Why, despite the experimental controls in place
(for example, blindfold and catch trials), is she able to judge that
“her niece” has been touched? Typically, to say (a) “I am going to
touch your arm,” implies (b) “I am going to touch you.” It would be
nonsensical to say (a) without implying (b). Likewise, when the doctor
says, “I am going to touch your niece’s hand,” she implies, “I am going
to touch your niece.” The concern here is not where the sensation will
be felt, but who will feel the sensation. Pace the prototypical situations
that motivate the Wittgenstein-Shoemaker intuition—it is not absurd
to inquire as to who is the subject of experience.
Let us divide the experiment into two parts: FB expecting that she
will be touched is Part 1. FB expecting that her niece will be touched
is Part 2. FB’s case should be regarded as directly relevant to IEM
because she has been primed by the doctor to introspect. We argue
that in Part 2 FB is misrepresenting her tactile sensation as belonging
to someone else. It is not the case that FB is misrepresenting the loca-
tion of a sensation, as, for example, the base-runner does if he first
represents his own leg as bleeding and then discovers that the bleed-
ing leg is attached to the catcher with whom he collided. Instead, in
Part 2, from FB’s first-person perspective, when introspecting on that
tactile sensation she misrepresents herself, such that she is not the
owner of the sensation. In short, FB commits an error through mis-
identification regarding just who is the subject of the sensation.42
42 One might still worry that FB’s error concerns the location, not the subject of
experience. For example, one possible characterization of FB’s Part 2 is “I feel the
sensation in my niece’s hand.” One could then argue that the subject of experience
is not misrepresented. We should not assume, however, that this spare description
can do full justice to the perplexing phenomenology. One problem is that it implies
that FB, in feeling the sensation, regards “her niece’s hand” from a third-person point
of view. Thus, it cannot fully capture the complex pathology. Why? Not only is the
clinician baffled by the experimental results, FB too is baffled by her own paradoxical
experiences (ibid., p. 251). Both FB’s experience and her relation to “her niece’s hand”
are first-personal, introspective. An appropriate characterization, therefore, must also
capture the perplexity from the first-person perspective. A more scrupulous reconstruc-
tion of this pathological experience would be: “I am introspectively aware of my niece’s
sensation.” Under this reconstruction, the subject of experience, or the ownership of sen-
sation, can be misrepresented.
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To repeat, we can concur with many of Shoemaker’s central theses:
(1) For every mental state there must be a subject who experiences it.
Moreover, for the sake of argument, we can agree with Shoemaker’s
WST. Thus: (2) Every mental state is in principle available to intro-
spection. And we think Shoemaker would be obliged to concede that
FB can only have the experience of a tactile sensation in Part 2 by
means of introspection.
Although Shoemaker does not explicitly adopt a position concern-
ing the ownership of sensation, a natural interpretation of his views
would be as follows. (1) and (2) conjoined suggest: (3) Every mental
state is experienced by the one who is currently introspecting that
state.43 The position is made explicit by Coliva,44 who takes herself
to be “vindicating” Shoemaker’s claim that “in being aware that one
feels pain one is, tautologically, aware, not simply that the attribute feels
pain is instantiated, but that it is instantiated in oneself.”45
We have formulated (1)–(3) in a way that fully accommodates
Shoemaker’s views. Our argument is that (1)–(3) do not provide suf-
ficient ground to establish IEM. Proponents of IEM fail to take into
account that (1)–(3) do not imply: (4) Every mental state is, from
the first-person point of view, represented as experienced by the one
who is introspecting the state. It is (4) that is needed for IEM to
hold. FB’s case is a counter-example to IEM because (4) is not true
of those cases for which FB is introspectively aware of tactile sensa-
tion in Part 2. Although the attribute feels sensation is instantiated
from the first-person point of view, it is not the case that the tactile sen-
sation is instantiated in self. FB does not represent it in that way. The
two instantiations are not tautologically linked. For IEM to be true,
(4) must hold necessarily. But it does not hold with strict necessity;
hence, IEM fails.
It is then empirically possible for a subject, while introspecting
a mental state (and thereby knowing that someone is undergoing
that state), to be in error with regard to who is experiencing that
particular mental state. Admittedly, this is counterintuitive. The
43 Shoemaker does, however, imply this position. See “Self-Reference and Self-
Awareness,” pp. 559–60, 565–67. We could articulate (3) such that it even more com-
pletely reflects Shoemaker’s preferred mode of expressing his position by adding two
clauses: (a) introspective awareness of phenomenal character occurs “if the subject
reflects,” and (b) it is just such introspective awareness that enables us to render judg-
ments of the sort under consideration here, such as “I feel pain” (or, as applied to this
case, “I feel a tactile sensation”). The relevant passages from Shoemaker are quoted
above: the citation for (a) is indicated in fn. 29 and for (b) in fn. 16. But neither (a)
nor (b) is critical to our argument.
44 Coliva, “Thought Insertion,” pp. 28–29.
45 Shoemaker, “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness,” pp. 563–64.
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Wittgenstein-Shoemaker intuition—it is absurd to inquire of the per-
son who introspects and reports a toothache whether it is indeed
that person who has the ache—strikes all of us as correct. But
empirical inquiry has ways of upsetting the apple cart: it would by
no means be absurd to ask of FB whether it is she who has the tactile
sensations, even though it is she who produces the introspectively
based report.
An important contrast here calls for explanation. We have a fact
and a foil,46 the contrast between the two parts of FB’s case. In Part 1,
when FB is primed to introspect on what she experiences, she reports
nothing; in Part 2, when she is primed to introspect on what her niece
experiences, she reports tactile sensation.
To ignore this difference would be to ignore a significant explana-
tory problem. Because Parts 1 and 2 have similar histories, it is pos-
sible to ask sensible contrastive questions that enable us to elicit causal
differences.47 This possibility is not permitted by IEM. The essential dif-
ference between the two parts is whether FB represents herself as the
subject of the mental state. This issue, concerning first-person represen-
tation of just who the subject is, we refer to as mental ownership.
One might worry that FB merely reports feeling the sensation,
when in fact she does not feel anything. But had there been no actual
sensations on this series of tests, the reports would not have been
made. First, recall that in FB’s case the lesion was subcortical; her
somatosensory cortex was preserved. So it is not surprising that she
retained the capacity for experiencing tactile sensations (provided
that these were referred to someone else’s body). Second, FB’s per-
formance on catch trials was perfect. Included among the catch trials
were instances in which she was told that her niece’s hand was going
to be touched, when in fact it was not touched. In these trials she
never once made a false report—neither on the first nor the second
day of the experiments. Third, other standard procedures were in
place to monitor FB’s sustained attention and reliability of response:
FB’s hand was touched in a randomized, fixed sequence, which was
repeated in four sessions on two separate days. Because she was blind-
folded and because of the other controls that were in place, she could
only have given an accurate report had she actually experienced the
sensation of being touched.
Moreover, imaging studies of self-referential processing show that
there is no reason to suspect that problems pertaining to mental
46 See Peter Lipton, “Contrastive Explanation,” in David-Hillel Ruben, ed., Explana-
tion (New York: Oxford, 1993), pp. 207–27.
47 Ibid., pp. 217–19.
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ownership typically impair tactile processing. Northoff et al.’s analysis
of many and varied studies that engage the “feeling of mineness”48
indicates that these experiences are subsumed by a set of commonly
activated regions within the cortical midline structure (CMS), regions
that do not include the somatosensory cortex.49 More specifically, as
regards somatoparaphrenia, Feinberg et al., in a detailed study of
13 patients who had been examined using brain-imaging techniques
within one week of acute hospitalization, identified a pattern of lesions
distinctive of those who exhibited its clearest symptoms: repeated,
refractory expressions of the conviction that their limbs belonged to
someone else.50 In this study, the region found to be most distinctive
was not the somatosensory cortex; rather, it was the orbitomedial fron-
tal cortex.51 The claim here is not that any one region of the brain plays
an exclusive, causal role in the etiology of somatoparaphrenia. The
claim is that there is no empirical reason to suppose that what under-
lies the distinctive phenomenology of somatoparaphreia necessarily
involves incapacitation of areas critical to somatosensory processing.52
The only remaining reason to suspect that FB actually did not ex-
perience the sensations is the worry that her case is analogous to blind-
sight. In the case of numbsense—also referred to as “blindtouch”—
although subjects lack conscious tactile experience, they are to some
degree capable of nonconsciously processing tactile information.53
48 Georg Northoff et al., “Self-Referential Processing in Our Brain—A Meta-Analysis
of Imaging Studies on the Self,” NeuroImage, xxxi, 1 (May 2006): 440–57. In character-
izing the “feeling of mineness” the authors say that “the self we consider here is an
experiential self that mediates ownership of experience.” See p. 441.
49 Concerning the role of the CMS, Northoff et al. say, “Taken together, our results
suggest that self-referential processing is mediated by cortical midline structures… .We
conclude that self-referential processing in CMS constitutes the core of our self and
is critical for elaborating experiential feelings of self, uniting several distinct concepts
evident in current neuroscience.” See p. 440; also see pp. 448–49. As regards the rela-
tion between CMS and sensory processing, they report: “Our review of neuroimaging
studies reveals a set of commonly activated regions, within the extended CMS, during
self-related tasks using a diverse set of sensory modalities. Activation in CMS must there-
fore be considered independent of the sensory mode within which the self-related
stimuli were presented. Such sensory independence of neural activity in CMS can be
observed in all domains.” See p. 449.
50 Feinberg et al., op. cit.
51 “The orbitofrontal lesion was critical in the development of somatoparaphrenia
versus simple asomatognosia.” See ibid., pp. 279–80.
52 Cf. many of the cases reviewed by Vallar and Ronchi, op. cit., Table 1, pp. 536–37.
53 See Jacques Palliard et al., “Localization without Content: A Tactile Analogue of
‘Blindsight’,” Archives of Neurology, xl, 9 (September 1983): 548–51; Alberto Gallace
and Charles Spence, “The Cognitive and Neural Correlates of ‘Tactile Consciousness’:
A Multisensory Perspective,” Consciousness and Cognition, xvii, 1 (2008): 370–407; and
Yves Rossetti et al., “Implicit Body Representations in Action,” in Helena De Preester and
Veroniek Knockaert, eds., Body Image and Body Schema (Philadelphia: John Benjamins,
2005), pp. 111–25.
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In other words, perhaps FB was informationally sensitive to being
touched but not experientially sensitive to being touched.
However, FB’s case could not have been an instance of numbsense.
For one thing, well-studied cases of numbsense involve damage to the
primary somatosensory areas, very much unlike the case of FB. More
importantly, in cases of numbsense the ability to make verbal report is
lost. The reason given for ascribing numbsense is that the patients are
able to point, with a moderate degree of accuracy, to the place where
they were touched. In other words, by analogy to blindsight, their
success at guessing based on nonconscious information is indicated
by pointing, not by verbal report. FB’s case is clearly not like this, since
her capacity for verbal report is well preserved.
In conclusion, it seems that we are not immune in the way that IEM
indicates. FB’s introspections give rise to puzzling responses that are
not compatible with IEM. Shoemaker’s critical mistake might have
been to infer from “what can happen as a matter of course,” to what
must necessarily be true of introspection and mental states.54
iii. iem and the sense of agency: body swap illusion
The case against IEM can be made in multiple ways. In the previous
section we dealt with bodily sensations. Here we show that similar prob-
lems can arise for the sense of agency concerning mental ownership.
Cognitive neuroscientists have been investigating whether specially
designed experiments can induce in healthy subjects certain illusions
pertinent to bodily self-consciousness. For example, in the case of the
“Rubber Hand Illusion” it has been shown that ordinary people can
experience an artificial hand as their own.55 In these experiments,
investigators primarily have been interested in the ownership of body
parts and various phenomena that involve self-as-object rather than
self-as-subject. In at least some of these experimental cases, however,
issues relevant to IEM and self-as-subject are implicated. Most note-
worthy among these is the “Body Swap Illusion.”
In this case the illusory experience of owning a body that belongs to
someone else is induced in healthy subjects. Although some among the
neuroscientists who discovered the illusion are concerned only with body
ownership, we argue that some of their experiments actually involve
ownership of mental states. In the particular case described below, sub-
jects can misrepresent themselves as experiencing someone else’s experi-
ences. After describing the experiment, we explain how it violates IEM.
54 Shoemaker, “Self-Knowledge and ‘Inner Sense,’ Lecture II,” p. 273.
55 Matthew Botvinick and Jonathan Cohen, “Rubber Hands ‘Feel’ Touch that Eyes
See,” Nature, cccxci (February 19, 1998): 756.
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The Body Swap Illusion was first demonstrated in a series of ex-
periments conducted by Petkova and Ehrsson.56 In one setting (their
Experiment 5), two persons were involved: experimenter and sub-
ject. The experimenter wore a helmet outfitted with two closed-circuit
television (CCTV) cameras, which transmit signals to a specific place.
By positioning the cameras thus, the scenes they registered presented
the experimenter’s viewpoint. Wearing a set of head-mounted displays
(HMDs), the subject stood face to face with the experimenter. The sub-
ject’s HMDs were connected to the two CCTV cameras on the experi-
menter’s head such that the images from the CCTV cameras played on
the HMDs. The effect of this set-up was that the subject, adopting the
experimenter’s perspective, visually perceived himself rather than the
experimenter.57 The subject could see his own body from the shoulders
to slightly above the knees. Both experimenter and subject were in-
structed to extend their right hands and then take hold, as if to
shake. During the course of the experiment the two were instructed
to squeeze one another’s hands repeatedly, each time for two minutes.
In the illusion condition, they squeezed in a synchronous manner; in
the control condition, they squeezed asynchronously, alternating, the
experimenter responding to the subject semi-randomly.58
Twenty subjects participated in this experiment, and each was inter-
viewed immediately afterwards. The authors claim that the experi-
ment “demonstrated that this set-up evoked a vivid illusion that the
experimenter’s arm was the participant’s own arm and that the par-
ticipants could sense their entire body just behind this arm.”59 To
obtain more objective, quantifiable data, the scientists incorporated
an anxiety-inducing threat into the experimental design (a knife above
the wrist to suggest cutting of the hand) and measured each subject’s
skin conductance response (SCR). They reported that they “observed
significantly stronger skin conductance responses when the knife was
moved near the experimenter’s wrist than when it was moved towards
the participant’s own hand in the synchronous condition.” 60
This experiment has significant implications for IEM. Note that in
describing the participants’ phenomenology, the authors say, “after
the experiment, several of the participants spontaneously remarked…‘I
56 Valeria Petkova and Henrik Ehrsson, “If I Were You: Perceptual Illusion of Body
Swapping,” PloS One, iii, 12 (December 2008): 1–9.
57 Recall that one of Shoemaker’s three prototypical examples of introspection is
“I see a canary.” See “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness,” p. 557.
58 Petkova and Ehrsson, op. cit., p. 4, Figure 6.
59 Ibid., p. 5.
60 Ibid., Figure 7.
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was shaking hands with myself!’”61 Although the subjects “could clearly
recognize themselves and distinguish between their own arm and the
arm of the experimenter,” this illusion is so robust that “a participant
can face his or her biological body and shake hands with it without
breaking the illusion.”62
How should this aberrant experience be understood? The most
natural way to characterize the subjects’ phenomenology is with re-
spect to agency. When they experience the illusion of shaking hands
with themselves, their experiences involve misrepresentation of action
awareness—that is, the misrepresentation concerns “who” shakes their
hands. This poses a problem for Shoemaker’s IEM.
From the subjects’ first-person point of view, the handshaking
experience involves the awareness that I am the agent of this action.
This recently has been called “agentive experience” or “agentive self-
awareness”—I experience myself as someone who is doing some-
thing.63 What is distinctive about the Body Swap Illusion is that the
subjects’ agentive experience is mistaken. Although it was really the
experimenter who was shaking their hands, the subjects misrepre-
sented themselves as the agent of the action.64
To see how this creates a problem for Shoemaker’s IEM as regards
the case in question, we can agree with Shoemaker on each of the
following: (1) For every agentive experience there must be a subject
who experiences it. (2) Every agentive experience is in principle avail-
able to introspection. (3) Every agentive experience is experienced by
the one who is currently introspecting it. The crucial point, however,
is that (1)–(3) together do not imply: (4) Every agentive experience is,
from the first-person point of view, correctly represented as experienced by
the one who is introspecting it. Without (4) the ground upon which
IEM stands is shaken.
Recall that one of Shoemaker’s prototypical examples of self-as-
subject is “I am waving my arm.” According to IEM, it cannot happen
61 Ibid., p. 5.
62 Ibid., p. 1.
63 Tim Bayne provides a clear example of agentive experience: “It’s your first day as a
waiter/waitress, and you are pouring water into a glass from a jug. As you pour the
water, you experience yourself as an agent. You experience yourself as someone who
is doing something, rather than someone to whom things are merely happening.” See
Bayne, op. cit., p. 3. Also see Bayne and Elisabeth Pacherie, “Narrators and Compara-
tors: The Architecture of Self-Awareness,” Synthese, cvix, 3 (December 2007): 475–91.
64 Bodily sensations might play a contributing role: light pressure, intensity, duration,
and location on the hand, at the points where the hand is squeezed, can all be experi-
enced. But the illusion—“I was shaking hands with myself ”—primarily involves action
awareness. Also, as we have argued in section ii, IEM can be violated in the case of
bodily sensations.
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that I ammistaken in saying “I am wavingmy arm” because although I do
know of someone that is waving his arm, I am mistaken in thinking that
person to be myself. I am necessarily aware that I am, myself, waving
my arm. Mutatis mutandis for handshaking. This too clearly involves
agentive experience. But as the body swap case shows, having an expe-
rience of handshaking does not guarantee that the agentive experience
cannot be misrepresented. The mode of representation matters. Here,
while in the illusory state, I am introspectively aware of the shaking
hands, but I misattribute agency. I commit an error that violates IEM.
In the case of somatoparaphrenia, a subject violates IEM because
she experiences a mental state in virtue of having represented that
state as belonging to her niece. In the case of body swap, subjects vio-
late IEM because they represent themselves as agents when plainly
they are not. In both cases IEM is violated. Introspective awareness
that a mental state is instantiated, pace Shoemaker, does not prevent
us from error as regards mental ownership.
iv. response to possible criticisms
In this section we consider three possible objections. The first con-
cerns the relationship between conscious experience and reportability.
The second concerns whether IEM should be regarded as a concep-
tual truth, and the third concerns an alleged distinction between agency
and ownership.
First, the reason FB’s case is particularly troubling for IEM is that it
consists of two parts which reveal an explanatory contrast. In Part 1,
when told that she will be touched, FB does not feel the sensation;
yet, in Part 2, when told that her niece will be touched, she feels
the sensation. The contrast exhibited here provides strong support
for the claim that the self-as-subject of the relevant mental state is
misrepresented in Part 2. Since FB felt the tactile sensation in Part 2,
why didn’t she feel it in Part 1? The only difference between Parts 1
and 2 concerns how the subject, from the first-person perspective,
represents with regard to who is to be touched.
To salvage IEM, one might consider an alternative interpretation
of her responses. Perhaps FB actually felt the sensation in Part I
but, due to her pathologies, just could not report them. Were this so,
the critical issue posed by this case might turn on the ability of FB to
report tactile phenomenology, not the phenomenology itself. Propo-
nents of IEM then could argue that IEM remains unchallenged because
it does not presuppose a necessary connection between reportability
and phenomenology. They could argue that FB felt the sensations both
in Part 1 and Part 2, so it did not really matter whom the doctor said
would be touched. It was just that FB failed to report it in Part 1.
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Successful defense of IEM, however, requires that this strategy not
remain mere speculation. There must be some reason to suggest
that it accurately describes what transpired in FB’s case. But no well-
motivated reason suggests itself. On the contrary, there is good reason
to think our interpretation of FB’s case is accurate. Once again, recall
that in order to ensure the reliability of FB’s reports, the doctors
conducted several catch trials that were evenly distributed across three
different prompts: your right hand, your left hand, and your niece’s
hand. When untouched, FB never reported any sensation. When her
right hand was touched, she always, unerringly, reported sensation.
When her left hand was touched, she never reported sensation. But
when her “niece’s” hand was touched, she recovered tactile sensation.
There is simply no evidence to suggest that reportability was a problem
for her.
A second possible criticism is related to Campbell’s interpretation
of schizophrenia.65 Campbell takes IEM to be a datum in need of ex-
planation.66 Indeed, he acknowledges, in accord with Wittgenstein
and Shoemaker, that people take for granted the absurdity of asking,
“Someone has a headache, but is it me?” Nevertheless, he does sug-
gest that “there is some structure in our ordinary notion of the owner-
ship of a thought which we might not otherwise have suspected.”67
Coliva criticizes Campbell’s interpretation of schizophrenia, and it
is her defense of IEM that might abet those who would argue against
our position.68 Here the concern is just what constitutes mental owner-
ship. We should first emphasize that we do not agree with the entirety of
Campbell’s argument—neither is IEM a datum, nor is the Wittgenstein-
Shoemaker intuition veracious. What we do share with Campbell is the
contention that ownership, as it pertains to conscious experience, is
more complex than typically is acknowledged.
Responding to Campbell concerning the ownership of mental
states, Coliva contends, “If a subject is introspectively aware of pain,
this just means that she is feeling pain…it is a matter of conceptual
truth that if a subject is introspectively aware of a certain mental state,
then she herself is having it and, therefore, that mental state is her own.”69
She emphasizes that, as a matter of conceptual truth, introspective
65 Campbell, “Schizophrenia, the Space of Reasons, and Thinking as a Motor Pro-
cess,” The Monist, lxxxii, 4 (October 1999): 609–25.
66 Campbell, “Immunity to Error through Misidentification and the Meaning of a
Referring Term,” pp. 91–94; Campbell, “The Ownership of Thoughts,” Philosophy,
Psychiatry and Psychology, ix, 1 (March 2002): 35–39.
67 Campbell, “Schizophrenia,” p. 610.
68 Coliva, “Thought Insertion.”
69 Ibid., pp. 28, 29. Original essay not italicized.
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awareness of a mental state guarantees that one is the owner of said
state. In developing her position she contends that other than intro-
spective awareness, there simply is no independent criterion for what
is to count as ownership of a conscious state. She regards this as a
“vindication” of Shoemaker’s treatment of IEM as a tautology.70
But Coliva’s view cannot save IEM. To see why, for the sake of argu-
ment, let us agree that there really are no independent criteria. The
problem then would be that lack of independent criteria would by no
means imply that mental ownership cannot be misrepresented. The
key statements (1)–(3), as discussed in the previous sections, can be
reformulated as follows: (1) Every mental state belongs to a subject.
(2) Every mental state is in principle available to introspection. (3)
Every mental state belongs to the one who is currently introspecting
that state. Notice that Coliva’s view is fully accommodated by (3). As
we have argued above, however, (1)–(3) together do not imply: (4)
Every mental state is represented (from the first-person point of
view) as belonging to the one who is introspecting the state. Coliva’s
objection fails because she neglects (4).
Furthermore, it is not clear that there are no independent criteria
for determining mental ownership. Recall what transpires in the case
of FB: when advised that she would be touched, she felt nothing.
When advised that her niece would be touched, she felt tactile sensa-
tions. If we regard IEM as a tautology, if we believe that introspective
awareness guarantees mental ownership, then we arbitrarily dismiss
the possibility of discovering independent criteria. Such dismissal
would be tantamount to begging the question. What has been dis-
covered in the cases of somatoparaphrenia and the Body Swap Illu-
sion is that first-person representation of the ownership of mental
states does not comport well with what might seem to be logically
necessary or conceptually guaranteed.
FB recovers sensation because she has been cued not to represent
the touch as an experience of her own, but as an experience that
belongs to her niece. In other words, how the subject represents the
experience provides an independent criterion for determining mental
ownership. There is no question as to whether or not it is FB who is
providing a report based on introspection. So there is no denying that
information concerning the tactile sensation is available to FB. But,
from the first-person perspective, this is not the end of the story.
Ownership of mental states is a more complex phenomenon than
the received view of IEM allows.
70 Shoemaker, “Self-Reference and Self-Awareness,” pp. 563–64.
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To the self-as-subject, from the first-person perspective, it matters
just how the relationship between self and sensation is represented.
Call to mind that one of Shoemaker’s projects has been to elucidate
“the distinctive way mental states present themselves to the subjects
whose states they are.”71 What we have found is evidence that the
distinctive way mental states present themselves to subjects varies
and that, for one form of representation, ownership is contentious.
It seems we have cases for which it would be by no means idle or
absurd to inquire as to whether the experiences of which a person is
introspectively aware belong to that person.
A third possible objection pertains to Gallagher’s distinction be-
tween agency and ownership.72 He employs this distinction to deny
that schizophrenic thought insertion causes problems for IEM, be-
cause he believes there is no doubt as to just where, experientially,
these thoughts are. The patient might well be sincere in expressing
the feeling that he is not the author of these thoughts, but that is
not to deny that these thoughts occur within his stream of conscious-
ness. “His judgment that it is he who is being subjected to these
thoughts is immune to error through misidentification, even if he is
completely wrong about who is causing his thoughts.”73 In short,
although the patient disclaims authorship, he does not deny experi-
encing the thought. Even in schizophrenia, there remains a nontrivial
sense in which the inserted thoughts belong to the patient. Accord-
ingly, in view of the fact that the relevant error in the Body Swap
Illusion concerns agentive experience, one might try to argue that
Gallagher’s distinction applies here as well.
There are several reasons why this defense of Shoemaker’s IEM
fails. (i) For those subjects who feel that they are shaking hands with
themselves during the illusion, it would still be reasonable to ask
Wittgenstein-Shoemaker questions: is it you who is having the experi-
ence of squeezing your own hand? Is it you who is shaking hands
with yourself? Arguably the most compelling intuition that motivates
IEM is that questions of this type are absurd. But here they are not
absurd. This very fact—that these questions can be well motivated—
indicates that IEM does not enjoy the kind of modal force claimed
by Shoemaker.
(ii) Admitting misrepresentation of agentive experience is already
detrimental to Shoemaker’s IEM. Again, one of Shoemaker’s proto-
typical expressions of self-as-subject is “I am waving my arm.” As is
71 Shoemaker, First-Person Perspective.
72 Gallagher, op. cit.
73 Ibid., p. 231.
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the case with “I am in pain,” “I am waving my arm” enjoys an ab-
solute immunity. Unlike “I am in pain,” though, here we have a
clear instance of agency. Shaking hands, just like waving, implies
agency. In other words, Shoemaker’s elucidation of IEM would still
be assailable.
Recall Shoemaker’s formal articulation of his claim: for a statement
“a is F” to be erroneous through misidentification relative to the term
“a ” is to allow for the following possibility: “the speaker knows some
particular thing to be F, but makes the mistake of asserting ‘a is F’
because, and only because, he mistakenly thinks that the thing he
knows to be F is what ‘a ’ refers to.” But for IEM statements, mistakes
of this type are not possible: whenever I say, “I am shaking hands,” it
cannot be the case that I am mistaken in thinking that the person
who is shaking my hand is me. It cannot be the case that I have erro-
neously identified myself as the person who is shaking my own hand.
But that is precisely what happens in the Body Swap Illusion.
(iii) Gallagher argues that the distinction he discerns in schizo-
phrenic thought insertion is sufficient to rescue IEM. But schizo-
phrenia is not analogous to the Body Swap Illusion. First, in the
case of body swap the error does not concern a lack of agentive ex-
perience; instead, it involves the erroneous attribution of agency to
oneself. In the illusory state, one takes credit for more—not less—
than one is capable of. Violation of Shoemaker’s IEM in this instance
is not due to denial of agency.
Second, in describing the schizophrenic’s attribution of agency,
Gallagher observes, “with respect to agency, he is in a position to
make only statements in which he uses the first person pronoun as
object―and in such cases the immunity principle is not at stake, and
therefore cannot be violated.”74 In other words, Gallagher’s view is
that because schizophrenics lack agentive experience, they can only
regard the “author” of inserted thoughts as object. Schizophrenia,
then, is conspicuously different from the case of body swap. In the
latter case, the subject misattributes agency to self. That is to say, the
agent is regarded not as object, but as subject. Since here the agent is a
self-as-subject, Gallagher’s distinction cannot safeguard IEM.
(iv) Finally, and decisively, this strategy simply would not work for
the case of somatoparaphrenia. No parallel argument drawing upon
Gallagher’s distinction can be made. The somatoparaphrenia case
involves no action on the subject’s part whatsoever.
In previous sections, we argued that adequate explanation of
somatoparaphrenia and the Body Swap Illusion requires recognition
74 Ibid. Italics added by the authors.
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that the ownership of mental states can be misrepresented. In this
section, we have responded to what we regard as the strongest de-
fenses of IEM and contend that they are not successful. We therefore
conclude that the best explanation of the relevant cases reveals that
IEM, rather than being a conceptual truth, is an empirical hypothesis,
open to verification or refutation. Indeed, this hypothesis is con-
fronted by substantive counterexamples.75
v. conclusion
We have, for the sake of argument, adhered to the distinction be-
tween self-as-subject and self-as-object. According to Shoemaker, “ab-
solute” immunity applies to self-attribution of mental states only as
regards the former. What we have discovered is that, even when con-
cerned exclusively with self-as-subject, we are not necessarily immune
to error in the way that Shoemaker claims.
According to Shoemaker, introspective awareness that one feels
pain tautologically implies both that (a) the attribute feel(s) pain is
instantiated and that (b) it is instantiated in oneself. But the cases
examined here reveal that (a) and (b) are just contingently con-
nected. It is important to distinguish between those states which are
instantiated in someone and those states—of which one is introspec-
tively aware—that are represented as belonging to oneself. Mental
states can be introspectively available to a subject without being rep-
resented as owned by the subject.
Accordingly, even when considering self-as-subject, we are not im-
mune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person
pronoun. Misidentification is possible because we can represent the
ownership of mental states variously. Because the ownership of mental
states is surprisingly complex there is no guarantee that subjects will
not misidentify the subject of experience.
75 Thus far we have not discussed perception of the external world—the third of
Shoemaker’s prototypical cases. But, in personal communication, Roland Zahn has
described a recent case which suggests that even here IEM can be violated. (Zahn is
a Clinical Research Fellow with the Neuroscience and Aphasia Research Unit at the
University of Manchester.) The patient was suffering from right inferior temporal
hypometabolism, problems pertaining to the supply of or ability to metabolize glucose.
Multiple clinical interviews designed to elicit the patient’s phenomenology consistently
revealed that visual experience required a two-step process: upon first becoming aware
of an object it was not immediately obvious that the object was being seen by self. In
order to recognize a visual experience as belonging to self it was necessary to take a
second step. This step involved relating what was being seen to who was seeing it. Cau-
tion is warranted in interpreting this case, for although the condition persisted for
at least two months, all information derives from clinical or diagnostic assessments.
No experimental protocols were employed. But if Zahn’s description is accurate, then
Shoemaker’s IEM fails for all three of the prototypical cases.
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Others who have considered the type of cases treated herein have
given most attention to the disownership of body parts. But from the
first-person perspective, the question as to whether one owns a body
part is distinct from questions concerning the ownership of mental
states. For example, in the Body Swap Illusion, subjects are able to
distinguish their own arm from the arm of the experimenter. Never-
theless, the illusion that one is shaking one’s own hand persists.
Ownership of body parts does not necessarily imply ownership of
mental states. By allowing for this possibility we are able to account
for what otherwise would be a wholly baffling phenomenon: I can
recognize the hand extended in front of me as belonging to someone
else while simultaneously feeling that I am shaking my own hand.
What does it matter if the ownership of mental states is complex in
the ways that we indicate? Although we do not separately develop the
issue here, one implication seems to be that first-person mental states
are not identification-free in the way that Shoemaker claims. And
since identification-freedom is a linchpin for many of Shoemaker’s
views concerning mental states and introspection, its loss would
betoken significant consequences for other aspects of his views on
self-consciousness.
Most philosophers agree that the what of conscious experience can
be misrepresented, but that the who can be misrepresented continues
to strike many as absurd. Shoemaker’s IEM is an articulation of this
robust intuition, the intuition that is well expressed by Wittgenstein’s
rhetorical question. But once these intuitions are clearly articulated,
they are better regarded as hypotheses. Otherwise they can be found
to arrest growth in understanding. Failure to allow for possible mis-
representation of the subject of experience leads to failure to ask im-
portant questions in empirical contexts.
Shoemaker’s articulation of IEM as a conceptual truth was an at-
tempt to say what is distinctive about self-consciousness. As we have
argued, however, IEM is neither datum, nor tautology, nor conceptual
truth. It is a hypothesis. By showing that mental ownership can be
misrepresented, we have exposed IEM’s vulnerability. Progress in
understanding self-consciousness will require further inquiry into
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